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We dedicate this book to the physicians, nurses, pharmacists, researchers, 
epidemiologists, and others who work so hard to create safe treatment of patients. 
We also dedicate this book to patients and caregivers who have lived with 
both illness and patient safety failures. 
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Introduction 
Suzanne Gordon and Ross Koppel 
VIGNETTE 1 
A few years ago my wife, Meg, had major surgery at a highly regarded, fully 
wired hospital. After surgery, Meg was wheeled up to the floor with her as-
signed room. Computer displays at the nurses' station indicated she had left 
the post-anesthesia care unit and was now on her floor. I was in the lobby 
waiting to be told of her room assignment. After about forty-five minutes I 
became alarmed. I searched the probable hospital floors and found Meg shiv-
ering, dehydrated, and alone by the elevators. I ran to the nurses' station down 
the hallway and asked why she'd been left there so long. They responded 
that they knew she was being sent up but didn't know she'd been left in the 
hallway. We hustled her into her room, covered her with blankets, and gave 
her ice chips. As a scholar of hospital workflow and health care information 
technology, I understood what happened, but I was still enraged. 
Had I not intervened, it's possible that someone would have noticed her. It's 
also possible that someone would n o t . . . or that someone would have noticed 
her and assumed she was calmly waiting for her transportation. (Ross Koppel) 
VIGNETTE 2 
Joan Smith (a pseudonym) is a nurse at a major American teaching hospital— 
one that has pioneered patient safety initiatives. She's informed by her 
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manager of a new improvement that allows charting (recording patients' 
medications and vital signs) in each patient's room, rather than at the central 
nurses' station. New computers have been installed in each room. Smith is 
eager to benefit from this improvement, although she finds it odd that none 
of the nurses was consulted on the placement of these new computers. 
She enters one of the newly configured rooms, starts using the computer, 
and is slammed in the back of the head by the door. Much to her dismay— 
but perhaps not her surprise—the computers have been placed where the 
door opens into the room. So if the door is opened while a nurse is standing 
at the computer, it will whack her in the neck, head, or shoulder. Worse, some 
of the questions the nurse asks patients are very personal; closing the door is 
both appropriate and required. 
At the next nurses' meeting, Smith points out that the unit's goal of reduc-
ing workers' compensation claims will not be aided by the placement of 
the new computers. More important, she asks why no bedside nurses were 
included on the team designing computer placement. When there is no 
response, she sighs and simply states, "Well, there go our compensation claims 
and our shoulders." As of this writing, the situation has not been addressed. 
VIGNETTE 3 
The cardiologist T. K. is seeing a patient who needs both a CT scan and an 
MRI. He uses the Computerized Physician Order Entry (CPOE) system 
to order both tests and is delighted to find that both tests have very similar 
ordering templates (user interfaces). Unbeknown to this physician, however, 
the CPOE system does not actually transmit CT scan orders to the radiol-
ogy department. A scan is neither scheduled nor administered. CT scans, he 
later learns, must be ordered via a different computer screen, but there is no 
indication of this at the time of ordering. For the patient, this means that 
finding his problem, and therefore starting the needed treatment, is delayed 
by weeks. The cardiologist did not remember ordering both tests and only 
reconsidered a CT scan when the patient was in extremis. 
Although the saying is attributed to Mark Twain, it was Charles Dudley 
Warner who said everybody talks about the weather, but nobody does any-
thing about it. By contrast, everyone seems to be doing something about 
patient safety. Every day our email includes messages announcing a new 
initiative launched by the Institute for Health Care Improvement (IHI)— 
one of the leading organizations in the patient safety movement—or a con-
ference hosted by another safety group. Books by patient safety advocates 
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such as Atul Gawande and Peter Pronovost now make the New York Times 
best-seller list. As if to highlight the importance of patient safety, President 
Barack Obama named the founder of a major patient safety organization, Dr. 
Donald Berwick, to be the administrator of the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid, although political pressures led to his resignation. 
Yet despite more than a decade of highly focused attention on patient 
safety, anecdotes like those we have related abound. Collected in quantita-
tive studies, these anecdotes paint a sobering picture of the state of patient 
safety both in the United States and globally. In 2010 several reports from 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality showed that the rate of 
bloodstream infections could be reduced dramatically by a series of simple 
steps (the so-called checklist), but at the same time, that agency reported, 
such infections had increased by 8 percent in one year throughout most of 
the nation.1 
In the same year, two professors from Case Western Reserve published 
an article in the Berkeley Technology Law Journal with even more distressing 
news.2 Doctors, the authors, warned, should be wary of the promise of elec-
tronic medical records. Software bugs, lack of adequate training in complex 
technology, incessant warnings of drug interactions with no real threats, and 
errors that generate the wrong output create significant patient safety hazards 
for which physicians may be held liable. As other authors, including one 
of the editors of this book, have pointed out, health care technology may 
be a bullet, but it does not seem to be the silver one so many experts have 
promised.3 
We have been working on this book for over four years. Some of the 
essays in it were begun that many years ago. When we asked authors for 
updates, many were able to provide more recent references, but alas, the 
progress of patient safety was seldom the reason for the updates. Despite 
the increase in funding and attention, the authors primarily included 
more recent studies and newer documentation of patient safety's unmet 
challenges. 
Please don't misunderstand our intention. We know there has been move-
ment on patient safety—numerous and important pockets of improvement. 
The problem is, as we shall see in this book, that too many of these 
pockets are isolated, and the sum of the parts does not seem to constitute 
an impressive whole. Many wonderful initiatives and activities often seem 
disconnected from, or undermined by, actions taken by the very institutions 
in which they have been pioneered. Institutions don't just fail to learn from 
one another; they may not even connect—and learn from—what is going 
on in one unit or discipline to what is going on in another. Across a single 
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hospital or health system, or throughout a region, or in the entire nation, it 
often seems that the proverbial one hand not only doesn't know what the 
other is doing but is deliberately canceling out the other's efforts as well. 
Here's a classic example. A hospital participates in a prestigious founda-
tion's initiative on improving care. The project, according to the foundation's 
website, has done "great work" to improve care on medical-surgical units.4 
Suzanne Gordon is observing on a hospital unit. She sees photocopied yel-
low sheets—with an image of a traffic sign triangle and in it the words "No 
Passing Zone" posted on every patient room. What does this mean, Gordon 
asks. The nurse accompanying her explains that this is an important part of 
the unit's safety initiative that has been implemented on the unit. Every-
one—from unit secretary to janitor—has been told not to go by a patient's 
room without looking in to make sure nothing untoward is happening. "For 
example," she explains, "if a frail ninety-eight-year-old lady is trying to climb 
over her bedrails, you don't just look in, see it, and walk by. You do something 
about it." 
"That's great," Gordon commented and then asked, "Does that apply to 
physicians as well?" 
"Oh, no," she answers, apparently without noting the irony, "only to hos-
pital employees." So the nurse, the janitor, the unit clerk—all have a duty to 
rescue the patient. But on a unit funded by a leading health care foundation 
and implemented by a leading patient safety group, the physician, who is 
supposed to be the captain of the ship/team, is exempt. 
Or take the issue of physicians' neckties. We now know that those care-
fully knotted, handsome cravats, so gracefully dangling over the front of a 
man's shirt, are the perfect vectors for germs. A male physician leans over a 
patient to examine a wound or to listen to chest sounds, and his tie brushes 
against the patient, the gown, the sheets. Now covered in germs, he moves to 
the next bed and brushes against another patient. And then on to the next. 
Studies have made clear how harmful this can be—so harmful, in fact, that in 
2007 the British National Health Service initiated a "bare below the elbow 
policy," banning not just ties but long fingernails, jewelry, and lab coats.5 In 
the United States, however, ties are still dangling from doctors' necks, lab 
coats are worn throughout hospitals, and so are jewelry and long nails, even 
though U.S. hospitals are trying to reduce infection rates. 
Patient safety initiatives come and go, some contradictory, many isolated 
or fragmented by departments or occupations. Some medical services or 
disciplines are largely ignored. And then there is the disconnect between 
management and staff, and between management and unions—all important 
"stakeholders" in patient safety. Efforts requiring comprehensive approaches 
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are introduced in piecemeal fashion; many patient safety programs are unnec-
essarily entangled with modern health care information technology (HIT), 
whereas others that could benefit from HIT are bereft of its assistance. 
This book is an exploration of why patient safety is advancing at what 
seems to be an almost glacial pace, despite the often vast and determined 
efforts of health care workers and managers. A collection of essays from 
prominent researchers, scholars, and even patients, this book aims to identify 
some of the gaps in the patient safety movement, the disconnected dots that 
do not coalesce despite decades of hard work and billions of dollars. It also 
identifies concerns that have not been integrated into the patient safety dis-
course or agenda of more established groups. 
Although the chapters deal with a variety of issues, a number of themes 
unite them. The first and most important is the fundamental contradiction 
between two of the imperatives driving our health care system: safety and 
cost. This contradiction is perhaps most acutely felt in the United States, 
where the health care system must address the requirements of many sepa-
rate insurance companies with differing priorities and patterns of coverage. 
Frequently patient safety becomes a casualty of the drive to cut health care 
costs and the accompanying failure to understand that ensuring safety is—in 
and of itself—a cost-saving activity. The essays in this book illustrate some 
of the predictable irrationalities of that contradiction. As Rosalind Stanwell-
Smith points out in "Too Mean to Clean," and as the chapter by Peter Lazes, 
Suzanne Gordon, and Sameh Samy makes clear, saving money by outsourc-
ing cleaning often results in dirtier hospitals, more hospital-acquired infec-
tions, and the additional costs of those unnecessary illnesses. Further, authors 
Sean Clarke, Christopher Landrigan, Alison Trinkoff, and Jeanne Geiger-
Brown document how increased workload and schedules that prevent clini-
cians from getting enough sleep increase both errors and costs. 
The anecdote recounted by the RN earlier in this chapter depicts the pre-
dictable irrationalities that result from the disconnection between cost, safety, 
and the work environment. The nurse who had her head slammed by the 
patient room door was on a unit concerned with both patient safety and the 
cost of worker compensation claims. But no one connected the dots when 
locating the nurses' computer stations. As a result, as the nurse commented 
sarcastically, "there go our worker's comp complaints and our shoulders." 
Much of the tension between patient safety and the market discourse 
dominating health care is embodied in the idea of patients as "custom-
ers." Patients are not, in fact, customers making informed choices based on 
full knowledge of their best options. The role and model of professional 
and caring clinicians is supposed to protect patients from unwise decisions. 
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But instead we have a marketing metaphor that largely replaces professional 
autonomy with a concern with salesmanship and misplaced customer satis-
faction measures. 
The market model stands in contrast to the ethical dynamic at the heart 
of patient safety. Patient safety begins with the injunction attributed to Hip-
pocrates: the physician (or hospital) should "first do no harm." When, how-
ever, doctors, nurses, pharmacists, hospitals, and administrators are obliged to 
consider their services as competing product lines within their institutions 
and told to view one another as competitors and their patients as customers, 
it is hardly surprising that the logic of the market may interfere with the 
ethics of the healer.6 
The second theme of this book concerns the place of frontline workers 
in patient safety discussions and initiatives. At the core of many of these 
chapters is an analysis of what happens when frontline workers are neither 
consulted nor involved in the planning, implementation, evaluation, and 
refinement of patient safety initiatives. Whether they be physicians and 
nurses who will be using health care information technology, or cleaners 
who are given insufficient supplies to do their jobs, failing to ask workers 
to identify safety problems and their remedies represents another hid-
den problem and cost. Ross Koppel and his colleagues contrast the over-
whelming faith in health care information technology with the reality of 
its use. They discover that lack of on-the-floor observation encourages 
the creation of software that does not meet the needs of clinicians and 
often increases the dangers of medication errors in ways that have been 
systematically ignored, deflected, or intentionally hidden in nondisclosure 
clauses of vendor contracts. They describe the ways in which software 
vendors fail to incorporate the often desperate requests of physicians, 
nurses, and pharmacists who struggle with screen displays that obstruct 
rather than aid in patient care. Koppel and his colleagues' discussion of the 
contradictions and inappropriate models underlying patient safety initia-
tives is echoed in the essay by Joseph Bugajski, a noted authority on IT. 
Bugajski's sardonic tale of his medical mistreatment involves professional 
blindness, HIT, foolish routines, and, as the title relates, "the data model 
that nearly killed me." 
Health care settings are messy, often unpredictable, emotional places, and 
they depend on dedicated workers. Running a hospital is not like running a 
factory or even a complex power plant; there is no design protocol that will 
handle all the resulting contingencies. If safety is primarily the province of 
experts or managers who make pronouncements in public spaces, it never-
theless remains the task of workers who inhabit private spaces. 
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As Lazes, Gordon, and Samy point out, the failure to consider seriously the 
input of frontline workers (particularly those low on the health care ladder) 
is connected to another issue identified in this volume: the impact of status 
and hierarchy on the safety of patients. On this point, we include Kathleen 
Burke's brief and insightful essay on how Medicare's rules for administering 
medication fail to take into account how medication is actually administered 
in hospitals. When actual work processes are not understood, or when, as 
Gordon and Bonnie O'Connor argue, some members of the health care 
team are considered the "mindless" servants of the mindful elite, safety will 
inevitably fall through the cracks. Similarly, as Gordon writes in "On Teams, 
Teamwork, and Team Intelligence," even some of the most promising experi-
ments in patient safety are defeated by those who are so concerned about 
maintaining status hierarchies that they are blind to their implicit but con-
tradictory messages. 
As we write the introduction to this book, the world has just celebrated 
the one hundredth anniversary of the death of Florence Nightingale, one 
of the first patient safety pioneers. Nightingale was also one of the first 
"systems thinkers" in health care. She recognized the importance and inter-
connectedness of every detail of patient care. Nothing and no one was too 
trivial to command attention and scientific study—from the cleaning of the 
ward floors, linens, and uniforms, to the food preparation, to the way supplies 
were maintained. 
Nightingale knew that systems thinking isn't just about the big-ticket 
items; it involves understanding how the components of the system interact.7 
A modern Nightingale would understand that if doctors and nurses have 
no time to wash their hands, or if outsourced cleaners aren't taught enough 
about infection control, then they will spread infection from one patient to 
the next. That is why another concern the authors of this book share has to 
do with the common but false dichotomy between patient safety and work-
ers' health and safety. Dr. Christopher Landrigan, a renowned researcher 
and advocate for regulating physicians' working hours, is joined by Alison 
Trinkoff and Jeanne Geiger-Brown in highlighting the connection between 
caregiver exhaustion and threats to patient safety. When RNs and MDs are 
overtired, they are in jeopardy, and so are their patients. Errors go up, and so 
do exhaustion and stress-related illnesses. Similarly, the skeptical and increas-
ingly cynical nurses we meet in the chapter by Lazes and colleagues are 
disenchanted with their hospitals' safety efforts because they feel that their 
concerns about workloads and work safety are ignored, or even attacked. 
You don't have to be a safety expert to recognize the irrationality of turning 
health care workers into patients. The chapter by nurse-researchers Linda 
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Treiber and Jackie Jones unites many of these themes and asks us to consider 
something that is too often forgotten in much of the discussion of patient 
safety. That is the impact of errors not only on the patients who suffer from 
them but also on the nurses and doctors who are links in the chain that led to 
the errors. Nurses and doctors who are institutionally and/or publicly iden-
tified as having committed errors tend to be scapegoated rather than helped. 
In fact, health care workers are profoundly distraught over any errors they 
have made. Their careers, their mental—and sometimes physical—health are 
also casualties of institutions that do not give sufficient attention to the sys-
temic causes of patient safety failures but instead rely on overworked staff and 
hypervigilant clinicians. 
The concluding chapter, by Koppel, Gordon, and Joel Leon Telles, pres-
ents twenty-seven paradoxes, ironies, and challenges of patient safety. It con-
siders many of the major reasons why it is so difficult to ensure the unharmed 
passage of patients through health care facilities—and why our efforts are so 
frequently contradictory or misdirected. As they note, even the concept of 
"avoidable" errors is a contested terrain of economic, professional, ideologi-
cal, ethical, and even epistemological disputes. 
The catalogue of disconnected dots mentioned earlier is certainly not 
exhaustive. Nor are the issues we tackle. Every discipline or occupation 
could have its own chapter. We do hope that these twelve essays stimulate a 
much-needed discussion. 
• CHAPTER 1 
The Data Model That Nearly 
Killed Me 
Joseph M. Bugajski 
In 2009 the U.S. government appropriated 
about $38 billion for health information technology and to create a program 
to digitize and network health information.1 The appropriation law also 
defines rules for some health information standards and systems. It does not, 
however, explain how to test the validity of the information used by those 
systems. I argue that these prescriptions for a Nationwide Health Informa-
tion Network (NHIN), though necessary, are insufficient. 
During the last week of January 2009, a faulty electronic networked health 
information system nearly killed me despite its being run by two advanced, 
state-of-the-art medical facilities. This will come as no surprise to health 
care IT experts because health information is inherently complex, medi-
cal science develops extraordinarily rapidly, patient interactions are intensely 
personal, and the number of data types and sheer volume of health care data 
explode prodigiously with new tests, instruments, and treatments.2 Because 
the purpose of an NHIN is data exchange, and data exchange requires a 
good model of the data being exchanged, and rapidly changing data make 
modeling intensely difficult, an NHIN is at worst infeasible and at best an 
extraordinarily difficult undertaking.3 
My near-death experience at one of the best tertiary medical centers in 
the world, equipped with modern electronic health information systems, 
illuminates the chasm between the NHIN vision and its reality. 
9 
10 FIRST, DO LESS HARM 
Treatment Saga 
My ordeal began on Sunday, January 25, 2009. I returned from church, 
ate breakfast, and sat down in my favorite chair to read the paper. Within 
an hour, my lungs were causing me so much pain that I had to lie down. 
Two hours later I had a 104 degree fever, a not-working-so-well emergency 
asthma treatment regimen, and a tortured conversation with my by then very 
concerned allergist. I was on my way to urgent care. My wife reluctantly 
agreed to drive me to the clinic affiliated with my allergist's office rather 
than a closer-by clinic, because, I entreated, the farther-away, affiliated clinic 
would enter the attending doctor's report and any test results into my elec-
tronic health record for my allergist to review on Monday morning. (Okay. 
Low blood oxygen was messing with my brain, but it seemed a good idea at 
the time.) Thus, day one of a near-death experience began. 
Urgent Care 
The nurse who escorts me into urgent care asks me for my doctor's name. I 
tell her my allergist's name. The nurse argues that she wants to know the name 
of my primary care physician. Of course, that information is in my electronic 
medical record, which she can readily access. The nurse next requests that I re-
late my medical history, which information is available in my electronic health 
record (EHR). Next, an attending physician asks for my doctor's name—no, 
not my allergist, my internist—and tells me to please relate my medical history. 
Never mind that (a) I provided this information to the nurse only moments 
ago, (b) I can barely breathe, (c) I have horrible pain in my lungs, (d) I have 
a high fever, and (e) the requested data already are in my electronic health 
record. Perhaps, I think, these professionals must verify my data—regardless 
of whether or not my brain wants more oxygen. I explain to the nurse and 
doctor that my allergist, who is a specialist in allergy and immunology, and 
who also has a Ph.D. in pulmonary medicine, wanted me to receive certain 
treatments. The attending physician at urgent care says that I may have pneu-
monia. I say that I also have severe asthma. She smiles politely and walks away. 
By and by the attending physician requests an X ray and a blood test. I 
ask for pain relief medication (the correct prescription is in my electronic 
health record). The doctor prescribes two Tylenol tablets, which do nothing 
for the pain. Hours go by. The X ray shows no pneumonia, says a radiologist. 
The attending doctor orders an intravenous antibiotic to help me deal with 
the infection and asks if I feel better. I say, "No, not really." Do I want a 
breathing treatment? "Yes, that would be good." I am sent home. 
THE DATA MODEL THAT NEARLY KILLED ME n 
During my visit to urgent care, starting about 1 PM and continuing until 
7 PM, my respiration is double to triple its normal rate. My lungs are bags of 
pain that trap C0 2 . I have a high fever. I want to die. Despite the existence 
of a well-maintained electronic health information record in a state-of-the-
art health information network, I am not treated for asthma aggravated by a 
lung infection as my medical history clearly and unambiguously indicates I 
should have been. 
Doctor's Office 
I cannot sleep during the night following the visit to urgent care. I am unable 
to breathe without intense pain. My respiration rate remains much higher 
than normal. But my fever has broken. First thing in the morning, I call my 
allergist's office. My allergist's nurse returns my call around 2 PM. She says 
that the doctor wants to see me at 4:30. He believes that I am still in seri-
ous trouble. My wife collects my medications (bless her, because later these 
would keep me alive) and drives me to my doctor's office. 
My allergist and his nurse do not take my medical history. I lie on a 
gurney in an examination room, hooked up to monitors and supplemental 
oxygen. My doctor listens to my lungs as I labor and cough my way through 
a few breaths. He observes my respiration rate. He waits awhile. He repeats 
these observations thrice. Around 5:30 my allergist says that I am too sick 
to return home and he wants me admitted to the hospital for continuous 
observation. I object. He replies that I may die if I go home. His nurse calls 
for an ambulance. No, my wife cannot drive me a mile and a half to the 
hospital—the doctor says this would be too dangerous. 
Ninety minutes pass before the ambulance arrives. My allergist spends 
the intervening time preparing a four-page memorandum giving my medi-
cal history, my current condition, and a recommended treatment plan. He 
also telephones the admitting physician at the emergency room, where I am 
heading next, to discuss my medical issues. My allergist then entrusts this 
information to the ambulance attendant. 
ERandlCU 
Once I am in the ambulance, the attendant asks me to give my medical his-
tory, including allergies and medications. This information he enters into a 
multipart form. When we arrive in the ER at the medical center affiliated 
with a world-renowned university, someone behind a desk calls me "asthma" 
then tells the ambulance attendant to park me in a hallway. The attendant 
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delivers his report, oral and written, to the triage nurse, who by then is ex-
amining me. The attendant tells the triage nurse that he brought a written 
report from my physician for the admitting doctor to read. The nurse in-
structs the attendant to deliver his reports to a person behind a nearby desk. 
She says the information will be put into my chart. 
I remained in the ER for twenty hours before being admitted to the hos-
pital. Throughout my stay, I was hooked up to network-attached monitors 
that incessantly sounded alarms to which no one responded. I was asked 
eleven times to repeat my medical history, medication, and allergies to as 
many different medical professionals. Seven doctors who saw me each asked 
similar questions. Five of the doctors were never to be seen again. All the 
doctors mumbled something about putting their findings into the hospital's 
EHR system. Later I learned from the nurses that most did not do so. No 
one read my allergist's detailed report about my condition and health history. 
I was moved from the ER to an ER holding room for admitted patients, 
back to the ER, to and fro to other departments for tests, then finally to an 
ICU. I was visited by nurses and technicians who pushed laptops mounted 
on wheeled sticks (COWs—computers on wheels). They checked my vitals; 
asked me questions about my history, medications, and allergies; and entered 
findings into the hospital's electronic medical record using the laptops 
mounted on wheeled sticks. 
I asked every nurse and doctor who met me for medication to relieve the 
intense pain from my lungs, and was told I would receive it. Each claimed 
that he or she would note the order in my electronic medical record. No one 
did until about fourteen hours after I arrived, when, during the middle of the 
night, one thoughtful ER nurse finally found a doctor to authorize giving 
me the oft-approved but never delivered pain relief medication. 
Data Lost and Not Found 
No one in the ER or, later, the ICU, knew about, or could find, my aller-
gist's memorandum describing my medical history, current medications, and 
treatment plan. My wife eventually called the allergist's office to obtain a fax 
copy for the ICU. No one ever mentioned reading the fax copy, although an 
ICU nurse confirmed its receipt. The list of persons who denied knowledge 
of the memorandum included the on-site doctor (the "hospitalist"), who 
represented the same clinic as my allergist. The hospitalist could view my 
electronic health records on-line from the hospital, but she ignored this rich 
source of vital information about my condition, preferring instead to come 
to her own (unbiased?) conclusion. 
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One heroic medical professional, the first nurse I met in the ICU, worked 
to create a consistent record of my condition, allergies, and medications in the 
hospital's electronic health information system. She spent over an hour search-
ing for previously entered data, correcting errors, and moving or reentering 
data. She argued with one doctor whose concurrent access to the hospitals 
system blocked my nurse's access to my information. She called the hospital's 
pharmacy repeatedly to get my medications delivered. She met and called doc-
tors several times. She even persuaded one doctor and a pharmacist to come to 
my room to resolve data errors in person. Despite these heroic efforts, I never 
received the correct medications during my stay. Indeed, my wife sneaked one 
of my inhalers into my room. After I used it, I finally began to recover. 
A Near-Death Experience 
At one point during my battle with illness and electronic health care data, 
the only asthma medication that had kept me alive began to wear off. I knew 
that if I did not receive the right dose within an hour or so, my condition 
would deteriorate rapidly and I would die. This critical information I had 
repeated nine times to doctors and nurses, who recorded it in my electronic 
health record. They promised that I would receive the medicine when it was 
time. That time came and went. My lungs began to scream with pain. My 
respiration rate accelerated. My breathing became more labored. I was crash-
ing. I begged the doctor who next stopped in to check my condition for her 
help. She said she would authorize the prescription. The heroic ICU nurse 
stopped by my room, checked my electronic records, but could not find the 
prescription. She then ran to find a doctor to authorize my medicine. She 
succeeded. I received the medicine. I lived. 
During the time I was hospitalized, I forced myself to remain coherent so 
that I could correct errors whenever medical professionals provided "pre-
scribed medications" or came to run tests. Figure 1 illustrates my experi-
ence. I twice received food to which I was allergic, both times after a doctor 
"recorded" a list of my food allergies. 
Needless to say, I was exhausted from labored breathing, a lung infection, 
pain, tests, effort expended to correct data model errors, energy wasted giv-
ing my medical history, and lack of sleep. Several times I stopped fighting. I 
relaxed. I thereby slowed respiration to my normal rate. This made my blood 
oxygen saturation rate drop precipitously, which in turn triggered monitor 
alarms—to which no one responded. (I learned later from a nurse's assistant 
that alarms always sound in the ER and the ICU, which is the reason no one 
pays attention to them.) 
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I finally understood the problem everyone was having when the heroic 
ICU nurse explained what she was doing while working with the hospital's 
electronic health records system. That in turn explained why so many caring, 
competent, knowledgeable, and talented medical professionals behaved so 
strangely when interacting with patients. It was because they were fighting a 
horrible data model. It was that data model that nearly killed me. 
Electronic Health Information Systems 
Medical personnel at urgent care and at the hospital who interacted with 
me all used a version of the same electronic health information system (the 
"system"). It became clear that everyone was fighting that system. Indeed, 
observations of their performance revealed that they wasted perhaps two 
fifths to three fifths of their time trying to make the system do something 
useful for them. The system prevented the medical professionals from fulfill-
ing their duties rather than helping them. 
Since my hospital stay, literature research and conversations with medi-
cal professionals around the world have confirmed that electronic health 
information systems are mostly broken. For example, I interviewed medical 
professionals, health care IT experts, and my allergist. They confirmed my 
sickbed analysis. Indeed, several experts said that they longed for handwritten 
charts once more hanging from the foot of every patient's bed.4 My analysis 
argues for a less reactive response. The industry requires a careful analysis of 
the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) associated with 
building a national health information network. If the nation simply accepts 
the NHIN vision while health care IT vendors collect some of the $38 bil-
lion stimulus bounty, individuals and businesses will pay higher medical costs, 
patients will receive inferior care, and medical professionals will lose precious 
time fighting IT systems instead of delivering better care. 
Killer Data Model 
Poor data model design deters medical professionals from delivering qual-
ity care. Conceptual data models capture information requirements from 
medical practitioners'perspectives.5 In contrast, IT professionals only vaguely 
understand medicine.6 
There are three types of data models: conceptual, logical, and physical. 
Logical data models express information requirements from a technical design 
perspective (for example, schema for relational database management system 
[RDBMS], schema for extensible markup language [XML] documents, or 
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formats for health insurance claims [a message model]). Logical data models 
fail if conceptual models are wrong, if errors occur in the transformation 
of the conceptual model into the logical model (forward engineering), or if 
logical design is faulty.7 
The root of the problem I experienced with health information systems is 
a bad data model. Evidence supporting my claim includes these observations: 
• Incoherent database design isolates patient information from one de-
partment to the next and from one organization to the next. This 
wastes time and increases errors because medical personnel must enter 
patient information into a unique view of the system that corresponds 
to user identity and department. This prevents one medical profes-
sional from seeing patient information input by another medical pro-
fessional. 
• Patient information is easily lost inside the electronic records system. 
• Hard copy patient information becomes dissociated from the elec-
tronic record. 
• Neither the system design nor the data model in this case suited the 
health care professionals' work patterns. They spent considerably more 
time performing record searches and data reentry than they spent in-
teracting with me, the patient. 
• No master data management (MDM) was in evidence. Producing a 
consistent record of me as a patient required the ICU nurse to copy 
data from multiple database views into the inpatient record. 
• Records of admitted inpatients are treated differently by the system 
than are records of outpatient or ER-only patients. No information 
about my medical history gathered during a prior visit to the same ER 
was available to my doctors or nurses. 
• Nurses and doctors do not have ready access to formulary listings. As 
a result, they wasted much time searching for information about my 
daily medications. Access to lists of medications in the system is limited 
to those at the hospital pharmacy. 
• No support existed for recording chronic allergies differently from 
allergies to ambient sources and foods. Lists of allergies were not avail-
able in drop-down menus, although these are well known to allergists 
and drug companies. 
The root cause of these problems is the failure of IT system architects 
to capture (health care) business requirements correctly. There also is no 
evidence that anyone ever produced a reliable conceptual data model. The 
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problem occurs commonly. Too often, system architects simply gather lists 
of requirements, then they ask their favorite vendors to quote the price for 
a product. This is non-architecture and system non-design. Rarely do archi-
tects request information architecture. 
Fault also rests with independent software vendors (ISVs) whose products 
fail to support the requirements of end users: real doctors, nurses, technicians, 
and pharmacists. Instead they build products to a marketer's or a developer's 
best guess about end users' requirements. It is easier to rush to market with a 
product that "looks good" to IT people but horrifies end users. This seems 
to have been the case with the electronic health information system used by 
the clinic and the hospital that treated me. 
Another common problem is that useful conceptual data-modeling tools 
do not exist. This broad challenge to the industry makes the best data mod-
elers' task more difficult as they work to create conceptual models, then 
validate those models with end users. Without good tools, information archi-
tects and data modelers often use technical elements to represent business 
concepts. This leads to problems with forward engineering because health 
care (business) concepts are mixed with data design technology artifacts. One 
group, HL7, has been working to develop a health care data model.8 
IT security professionals in the medical industry appear to be reluctant 
to deploy document authentication and encryption for users. Many com-
mercial health information systems can produce Adobe Acrobat versions of 
doctors' reports. These reports could be authenticated through the use of 
Adobe technology and transmitted to another physician via email encryp-
tion programs. The patient might even certify such transmission of his or 
her information by using electronic systems. This simple practice might have 
enabled admitting doctors to see my allergist's memorandum in their in-box 
instead of requiring paper copies to pass from one person to the next until 
they become lost. 
Clearly, the most serious problem is the lack of a consistent data model 
across departments and providers. This wastes time and increases errors. 
Unreliable Information 
Poorly articulated data models engender disbelief in system data among 
end users, who see data inconsistencies in competing entries about patients, 
their symptoms, their illnesses, and data entered by different physicians and 
nurses who cared for the patient. This problem was in ample evidence in 
the eleven full histories taken by every medical professional who checked 
my condition. 
